Patterns of Attention:
Attention and its Fringes in the Aesthetical Discourse (18th-21st Century)

Formes de l'attention:
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
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powered by

Attention, Hand and Brush: Condillac and Chardin

Michael Baxandall*

Attention – my first topic in this chapter – is a notoriously unstable concept with an intricate history. Sometimes 'attention' refers to focused perception, sometimes directed perception, sometimes selective perception, sometimes conscious or active perception, sometimes even specifically retentive or constructive perception. Also, sometimes it is an action, sometimes a state, and sometimes a sort of faculty. Attention can be any or all of these.

A similar state of affairs also existed in the mid-eighteenth century, and I am anxious not to have to spend most of this chapter exhibiting scruples about it. Yet some commitment to a meaning is necessary. Formal definitions – such as "Attention is the directing of the mind to one thing rather than other things" (Christian Wolff) – evade the complex interest of actual use. Instead, it is better to call on a rough functional specification and the best I know for the period occurs in Wolff's *Psychologia Rationalis* of 1734[1] (Appendix I). Wolff[2] had a good grasp of the thinkers who chiefly set the frame for

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1* [Questo testo è apparso in *The Beholder: The Experience of Art in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by T. Frangenberg et R. Williams, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, p. 183-194. Ringraziamo l'editore per averci concesso di riprodurlo].
 Wolff (1734).
2 A general placing of Wolff's psychology of perception is Arndt (1983).

eighteenth-century concern with attention, Locke
and Malebranche as well as Leibniz, though he
predates the radical French empiricist psychology
of the mid-century.

Attention here, then, will be understood as a
narrowing of perception (Wolff § 359), a narrowing
in proportion to its intensity (360) and one that
treats its objects sequentially (380). It is both
restless (373) and dependent on sense impressions
(357). Internal conditions of attention (nowadays
'endogenous', 'voluntary', 'conceptually driven')
are the will (362-3) and the act of reflection (380),
and a desire for pleasure (371) or for novelty (368).
External conditions ('exogenous', 'reflexive', 'data-
driven') are the strength (369) or the clarity (367)
of the sense impression and, in the absence of any
other determining condition, the accident of falling
in the centre of acuity (361).

This chapter will first make a few general
remarks about notions of attention to art in the
period, before going on to look at a text, and then
raise the question of whether this text runs well
with some paintings.

I. Early eighteenth-century conceptions of attention

From the first half of the eighteenth century
the two most familiar appeals to facts of attention in
prescriptive art theory come from Roger de Piles in

1704 (the date of the lectures published in 1708 as *Cours de peinture par principes*[3]) and William Hogarth in *The Analysis of Beauty* of 1753. Both invoke powerfully but rather crudely the very old point about the centralized acuity of the eye (Wolff 358).[4]

I shall not discuss them, except to say now that though their emphases are in contrast, they are not in principle contradictory. To de Piles, control of the beholder's visual attention to a painting was to be determining for the picture, and thus the importance of the unity of the object and the centralized structure of the composition of light and shadow. Hogarth's description of the eye's wanton chase, a course of mobile, varied, but coherent attention for which the serpentine line of beauty is a sort of emblem, might seem by contrast almost centrifugal. But de Piles frames much of his argument as a description of the effect of a picture on the first glance at it, while Hogarth frames his as an account of our sustained exploration of the picture. They present themselves as primarily interested in different moments of the process, respectively the moment of what would nowadays be called the gist and the phase of serial *scanning*. A picture more or less satisfying the letter if not the full spirit of both accounts is not inconceivable. Many pictures by Rubens would seem to do so.

But neither de Piles nor Hogarth were engaged with the new thinking about attention that was under

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3 In particular the sections "Du Tout ensemble" and "Du Clair-obscur", De Piles (1766), pp. 69-73 and 165-175.
4 In particular Hogarth (1700), ch. V "Of Intricacy", pp. 32-35.

way in their time. The agenda for this thinking was much determined by the agenda of the developing psychological empiricism[5]. This was so even of much thought that was not empiricist. For instance, one would hardly guess from Wolff's emphasis – though one might well guess from some of the detail and terminology – that he was a Leibnizian rationalist and committed to a soul and body that do not interact but act in parallel from predetermined harmony. Everyone, it seems, had to cover the empiricist bases.

Psychological empiricism saw our ability to perceive the world as the product of the individual's history of organizing items of experience, accumulative experience of interrelated sensations from the various senses. This obviously made particularly urgent demands for two kinds of agency – a source of psychological energy that would prompt the mind to move from one sense impression to another (otherwise there would be arrest), and a source of psychological organization that would enable one sense impression to be related in the mind to another sense impression. In the diffused Lockean account that underlay or shadowed much of the thought the energy was a psychic *uneasiness*[6] (Locke's word) generated by desire or need. And the first means to the organizing of sense impressions was *attention*,[7] the attention that activated memory. Attention was indispensable: without it the sense impression was not registered in our record of

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5 A general account of the epistemological background to this episode is Yolton (1984). A study placing Condillac in relation to it is Morgan (1977).

6 Locke (1695), II.xxi.31-40 (pp. 250-258).

7 *Ibidem*, II.ix.1, II.x.3, II.xix.1-3 (pp. 143, 150, 226-228).

experience and could not be associated with anything, or become part of a complex idea of anything – or enter into whatever other sort of constructive mechanism was in play.

The relation between attention and restlessness became particularly interesting in France. Locke's term 'uneasiness' was translated from the beginning, from the 1680s on, not as *mesaise* but as 'inquietude', *l'inquietude.* And inquietude was a very resonant concept with a history of still vigorous systematic associations ranging from St Augustine, an active element in eighteenth-century France, through Pascal. This episode, the currency of the concept of inquietude in the French Enlightenment, has been very well studied[8]. An outcome of it was that attention stood in a lively polar relation with an opposite – inquietude – that was much more positive than the merely privative opposite – inattention – that we are disposed to come up with nowadays. A lively relation between attention and opponent or contrary energies is defining for Enlightenment attention.

For instance, in the very well-known *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture*[9] (1719) by the Abbé Dubos there is an essential interplay between two levels of the relation. It is (says Dubos) a function of the arts to feed the soul's hunger for activity (that is, its inquietude) at times when attention to both external perception and to its internal reflection is disordered, the painful condition of *ennui,* which

8 Deprun (1979).
9 Du Bos (1732), with bibliography on pp. xviii-xix.

was not just boredom but a malaise of attention, indeed a morbid kind of inquietude: "an infinity of ideas without connection or relation, tumultuously succeeding each other" (I.1). The arts, poetry and painting, could counter it by offering to our natural inquietude artificial objects of attention, as it were. But painting was unlike poetry, which works mainly by appeal to the passions. Painting's attraction, its ability to canalize wholesomely our uneasiness, lies primarily in its manner of representation rather than its matter, since its technique, its *mécanique*, is more difficult and less familiar to us as practitioners than language, and is able to retain attention even with banal subject matter (Du Bos 1719, I.10-11 and 24; II.22 and 27). Attention and inquietude are here both the site of disorder and the means of cure.

An outcome of their central position was eventually a reversal of the terms of Locke's priorities, stated particularly sharply by Condillac at mid-century. Locke had seen uneasiness as the product of desire and need. Condillac argued the contrary,[10] that desire was one function of inquietude. It is Condillac who offers a sort of reductive taking to logical consequences of much of the previous half-century's thinking about the matter.

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10 Condillac's contradiction of Locke is particularly explicit in Condillac (1755), p. 325: "Locke est le premier qui ait remarqué que l'inquiétude causée par la privation d'un objet, est le principe de nos déterminations. Mais il fait naitre l'inquiétude du désir; et c'est précisément le contraire [...]".

II. Condillac and attention

In the *Traite des sensations*[11] of 1754, Condillac constructed his great thought experiment of the statue that learned to perceive. The statue learned to perceive visually only on being endowed with vision associable with touch. And it is an aspect of this association between vision and touch[12] that I shall examine.

Attention was central to Condillac's model of perception, a model that excluded Locke's mediating complex ideas. Being the presence of a sensation in consciousness, and being powered by a restless nexus of need and desire and curiosity, it was the active preliminary to all the other faculties – recollection (attention to past attention), comparison (attention to two things), judgement, imagination, recognition, and others (I.ii).

In Condillac's account there are four stages within the development of visual perception:

In the first (I.xi) the eye is not yet allied with touch and cannot perceive external reality. On its own the visual array is just a meaningless field of colours and the statue has no basis even for taking the colours as the product of something external to itself. Its inquietude and movement are simply rewarded with the pleasure of lively and changing

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11 The most convenient edition of Condillac's *Traite des sensations* of 1754 is that in Serres (1984), and when page references are appropriate they will be given in that edition. For Condillac and painting in general, see particularly Démoris (1982).

12 This association is a theme of Summers (1987), which places Condillac in relation to the tradition on pp. 325-326.

stimulation.

In the second stage (III.iii) the eye, now associated with the hand, learns by habitual association to perceive the figure and extension of objects, which are now also perceived as external to itself.

In a critical third stage the eye learns to extend the dispositions learned in the second stage beyond the reach of touch itself and to perceive independently more remote objects than touch can. It projects beyond hand's reach what it has learned with eye and hand in tandem. Vision has leapfrogged over touch, as it were.

Finally, in a defining moment of maturity, faced by a conflict between the urgings of the eye and of the hand – namely by a painting both seen and touched, in which the depiction is at odds with the tangible flat surface – it prefers the eye over the hand, accepts the depiction and rejects what touch tells it.

At crucial moments of his argument it is to experience of paintings that Condillac appeals. He does so on half-a-dozen occasions,[13] all but the one I have just mentioned relating immediately to attention. To paint a painting and to look at a painting are both models of the act of attention, and painters are athletes of visual attention. In visual competence painters stand to us rather as we stand to the statue in its early days.

In the passage reproduced in *Appendix II* we come in just after the statue has learned, with eye *and* hand, to perceive visually figure and extension. Condillac

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13 Serres (1984), pp. 77, 84, 175, 183 (preference of sight over touch), 185 and 296.

is insisting that it is a serial process, retaining the character of running one's fingers over something even if one learns to do it very quickly. It is, he says, like the process of scanning a painting, where we successively scan details, building up in memory a total perception. It is like looking at separate figures in a picture and separate features of figures, for instance a mouth, and combining them into the picture as a whole. It is also like joining a group of people and gradually parsing it into individuals – an analogy that surely invites elaboration as a model for art criticism.

The statue has to do this at all levels of complexity. It cannot even see a triangle without having analyzed it. And it is the history of parallel scanning by touch that permits and controls this. Then:

C'est la main, qui, fixant successivement la vue sur les différentes parties d'une figure, les grave toutes dans la mémoire: c'est elle qui conduit, pour ainsi dire, le pinceau; lorsque les yeux commencent a répandre au-dehors la lumière et les couleurs qu'ils ont d'abord senties en eux-mêmes.

It is the hand which, as vision fixes successively on the different parts of a form, engraves them all in the memory: it is [the hand] which guides, so to speak, the brush [;] when the eyes begin to extend themselves beyond the light and colours they at first sensed [as residing] within themselves.

It is the hand which guides, so to speak, the brush. This is a good joke but for the present purpose must be taken apart.

It depends on two equivocations, one overt and one tacit. The overt equivocation is between the hand as the instrument of touch, vision's guide, and the painter's painting hand. The covert one is between colours in the sense of the hues and tones in the visual array and colours in the sense of the painter's material pigments. The telescoped sequence of ideas is:

1) the hand (*sense A: touch*) guides the eyes to perceive

2) to perceive is to install order into an array of colours

3) pun: 'colours' as phenomenal colours / 'colours' as physical pigments

4) physical pigments in painting are ordered by a brush

5) that brush is guided by a hand (*sense B: painter's hand*)

6) joke: "the hand (sense A, in place of sense B) guides the brush"

This seems to me interesting not only because of the cultural habits of thought it assumes, but because it suggests a slight rearrangement of one's thinking about some paintings – not a key to any secrets about them, but a sympathetic medium for trying out thoughts about their peculiarity.

The hand here is attention, and visual attention

is a sort of ocular fingering. It retains the gait of touching with the hand, and visual knowledge retains the accumulative pattern of tactile knowledge. And the mental world of Condillac's joke entails a pattern of relationships, not fully systematic but suggestive – touch with attention, hand with touch, hand with brush, brush with pigments, pigments with picture surface, picture surface as against depiction, and touchable pigments as against visible colours, but again hand-with-brush as attention, and attention with touch.

III. Chardin and attention

In Condillac's time even routine criticism saw Chardin as a manipulator of the beholder's attention[14]. To consider Chardin's genre pictures would take us into the domain of the out-of-hand's-reach, which raises special issues, so comment here will have in mind primarily still life.

There is an old critical issue, going back to Diderot and beyond, about the authenticity effect, so to speak, of Chardin's still-life paintings. How do these pictures with their obtrusive paint surfaces somehow give a stronger sense of coherent experience and presence than neater paintings of

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14 For example, Baillet de Saint-Julien (1755), p. 5: "L'œil trompé par tant de légèreté, et la facilite apparente qui y règne, voudrait en vain par son attention et ses recherches multipliées, en apprendre d'eux le secret; il s'abime, il se perd dans to touche; et lasse de ses efforts, sans être jamais rassasie de son plaisir, il s'éloigne, se rapproche, et ne la quitte enfin qu'avec le serment d'y revenir".

apples and so on that seem optically more accurate? Perhaps the visual tangibility of the material paint surface somehow stimulates our response. But how, or within what conditions?

There seem to be three bases in the issue, all of which are verbalized in an exemplary way by Diderot[15] in the *Salon* of 1763 during his account of *The Olive Jar* of 1760 and *The Ray*, painted by 1728. The first is the effect of material presence in the painting:

> C'est la nature même; les objets sont hors de la toile et d'une vérité a tromper les yeux. [...] c'est qu'il n'y a qu'à prendre ces biscuits et les manger, cette bigarade l'ouvrir et la presser, ce verre de vin et le boire, ces fruits et les peler, ce pâté et y mettre le couteau. [...] O Chardin! ce n'est pas du blanc, du rouge, du noir que tu broies sur ta palette: c'est la substance même des objets, c'est l'air et la lumière que tu prends a la pointe de ton pinceau et que tu attaches sur la toile.

> It is nature itself; the objects exist outside the canvas and are so true as to deceive the eyes. [...] there is nothing to do but to take hold of these biscuits and eat them, take hold of this orange and open and squeeze it, this glass of wine and drink it, these fruits and peel them, this pâté and put the knife to it. [...] Oh Chardin! it

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15 Diderot (1968), pp. 483-485; or Diderot (1759-1781), I, pp. 222-223. In extracting formulations for my own purpose here I have mangled this famous passage as a whole. The first quotation is apropos of *The Olive Jar*; the second and third are addressed to *The Ray*.

is not ground pigment of white or red or black on your palette: it is the very substance of the objects, it is atmosphere and light you take on the tip of your brush and apply to the canvas.

The second is the apparently paradoxical conspicuous presence of paint:

Ce sont des couches épaisses de couleur appliquées les unes sur les autres et dont l'effet transpire de dessous en dessus. D'autres fois, on dirait que c'est une vapeur qu'on a souffle sur la toile; ailleurs, une écume légère qu'on y a jetée.

There are thick layers of colour put on one over another, and the effect is that they transpire upwards from below. At other times one would say that it is a vapour that has been blown on to the canvas; somewhere else a light foam that has been thrown on it.

The third is the observation that Chardin's paintings are in close view a surface of intricate paint from which one must move away to perceive representation.

Approchez-vous, tout se brouille, s'aplatit et disparait; éloignez-vous, tout se crée et se reproduit.

Go close: everything blurs, flattens and disappears. Step back: everything takes on form and being again.

It is this rather commonplace point that may seem a way of evading the paradox.

But the point seems only half-true, at most, and in any case would not be unique to Chardin. In fact, there is in Chardin much representation, for instance of reflections in glass or metal, or the sheen of oysters, that can only be read from close; and much paintiness, for instance of backgrounds, that only articulates itself as brushwork from some distance. What is so is that close and distant inspection – or for that matter narrowly or widely focused attention – offer different kinds of *combination* of depiction and paintiness. But an opposition between material paint and representation is always insisted on in some way, near or far.

Instead, Condillac prompts one to the counter-observation that the tangible quality of Chardin's paint surface is substantially a fiction. Most of the apparent relief texture of the surface is not actual but *represented,* by tones and hues – that is, represented in the same medium as the still-life objects of representation. The paint has indeed been worked but most of it has not been worked into the physical three-dimensional tangible texture we are led to think we perceive. Instead it has been worked into a *trompe l'oeil* pictorial representation of a tangible texture we think we perceive. (A technical peculiarity of Chardin's facture may go with this: he added unusual quantities of calcium carbonate to his pigments, an unrefractive substance that makes oil-bound pigments both pasty and translucent[16]). The result can be a physically even but visually penetrable

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16 Merrill (1981), which however I know only from the summary in McKim-Smith, Andersen-Bergdoll and Newman (1988), pp. 87-88.

surface that we see with our hands, so to speak, as being more uneven than it is.

There are exceptions to what I have just stated, the main exception being whites. In still-life pictures the whites represent highlights and particularly lustre, they are often late applied and are in real physical relief. One might, in passing, make two brief points about these. First, they must play some part in cueing us to go along with the fictive texture. Second, the material reality of these raised whites is mainly allotted – ironically – to precisely that element in the scene, lustre reflection, which is not fully objective, since lustre's placing is a function of the subject, moving on the object in relation to the beholder's stance, as other effects of lighting do not.

Where do we stand? Dubos has told us that we come to the picture in a condition of active suspense between inquietude at various levels and attention at various levels, respectively forces of energy and organization. The picture can both minister to and exploit our inquietude, and both give shape to our attention and manipulate us through our attention. And painting interests us mainly through the manner, as opposed to the matter, of representation.

And Condillac's eye that finally overrides touch is active here in a different way. Instead of depiction overriding surface, surface is recruited into the domain of depiction.

Part of the Chardin effect, Condillac prompts one to suppose, is first to dramatize the distinction between the material picture surface and the representation by insisting on it, and then to

compromise it. In one sense this is a dramatization of the opposition between inquietude and attention. He brings into the same medium of pictorial representation both the representational matter of still life and an illusory texture of the picture surface. As in Condillac's joke, there are a couple of equivocations in Chardin's painting: the overt one between the colours as pigment and the colours as depictive, but also the covert one between the pigment as physically real stuff and the pigment as something itself represented.

The result is to blur a distinction between reality and depiction. It is also to move the frontier between reality and fiction, specifically to push it back further towards the beholder. In this, perhaps it is a little like such things as the sort of theatre piece that legitimizes the actorishness of actors by having other actors act as an audience. But Chardin's medium, what he both enacts and manipulates, is the peculiarly powerful one of ocular fingering: attention. 'Hand' again guides 'brush'.

Appendix I

The propositions from Christian Wolff, *Psychologia Rationalis* [1734], 2nd edn, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1740 (repr. Hildesheim 1972), pp. 286-301 (I.iv. 357-80):

(Note: The translation from Wolff's Latin here is of his propositions only. The formal working out of the argument with cross-references, examples and sometimes further references is omitted. Some matters of interest in this are briefly indicated in square brackets. Behind this rationalist presentation lies a body of introspective observation described in Wolff's *Psychologia Empirica* of 1732.)

357 If we direct attention to some sensible, either its material idea [= sense impression] must be more lively, or the material ideas of other things seen at the same time must be less lively, or its material idea must be sustained in the course of others' constant and abrupt variation.

358 If we direct attention to some visible we direct the eye to it. [We see most clearly and distinctly along the optic axis.]

359 [...] attention can only be directed to a small part of a visible. [e.g., when looking at a person's face.]

360 The greater the attention we apply to a visible, the smaller the part it is directed to. [Optical argument from the need for density of visual rays.]

361 [...] if there is no reason why we should direct our attention elsewhere, that visible draws attention to itself, as it were, which is directly opposite the eye, or, if we are not observing precisely, that visible which, entering the eye along with several others, is the most directly opposite it. [Default reverse of § 358.]

362 If you wish to keep attention on a visible, you must keep the eye directed upon it. [Follows from § 358.]

363 But if by a decision of the anima you direct the eye to a visible or keep it directed there, attention will depend on freedom of the anima.

[364-6, 373-4, 376, and 381-2 are omitted here. They deal with *phantasmata* in an explicitly un-Aristotelian sense: *phantasma = idea ab imaginatione producta; imaginatio = facultas producendi perceptiones rerum sensibilium absentium* (Wolff, *Psychologia Empirica*, §§ 92-3).]

367 If we perceive several things at once with different senses and if there is no reason why we should direct attention to any one of them in particular, we direct it to that one which is most clearly perceived. [Rare: usually there is some object for attention.]

368 If several things are perceived by a sense at once and there is no reason why we should direct attention to any one in particular, we direct it to that which has little similarity with those others we have already perceived elsewhere. [To be observed in animals, because they lack reason anyway.]

369 If different objects act at once on different sensory organs, that whose material idea is more lively draws attention to itself.

370 […] if different objects act at once on different sensory organs, that which acts on an organ with more force or more strongly is the one that draws attention to itself. [Cf. § 367. §§ 369-70 are difficult to submit to experiment.]

371 If we perceive pleasure from something, we fix our attention on it and keep it there. [e.g., a newly printed book in a bookshop.]

372 If we perceive tedium from something, we turn our attention away from it. [e.g., *pictura in regulas artis peccans.*]

375 In the body, continuous effort to keep the eye fixed on the same spot is the response to the sustaining of attention. [It is not easy to keep the eye on one thing for long.]

377 If attention is directed to one thing perceived along with other things, we strive to turn attention away from these others.

378 Along with the directing of attention to some sensible or its phantasm there always goes an effort to turn attention away from other things being perceived at the same time; or, if it is realized that cannot be done, an effort to turn the sharp point [*acies*] of the sense on that sensible which we deem worthy of attention. [Thus looking at the ground when attending to spoken words, squinting the eyes when visually examining a thing closely.]

379 [...] along with the directing of attention in the *mens* go those above-mentioned strivings in the body. [...] these strivings in the body are in response to desires in the *mens*. [Sometimes conscious, more often not.]

380 If we reflect on a visible, we direct the eye successively now to some now to other parts of that visible. [To attend demands pause: movement of the eye is not continuous but is interrupted by pauses (i.e., fixations) while retaining a course (i.e., scanning).]

Appendix II

Condillac, *Traité des sensations* [1754], III.iii.13-15 (text from M. Serres (Ed.), Condillac, *Traité des sensations. Traité des animaux* (*Corpus des Œuvres de Philosophie en Langue Francaise*), Paris 1984, pp. 175-6).

Comment ses yeux sont [...] guidés par le toucher

L'œil ne parvient donc a voir distinctement une figure, que parce que la main lui apprend a en saisir l'ensemble. Il faut que, le dirigeant sur les différentes parties d'un corps, elle lui fasse donner son attention d'abord a une, puis a deux, peu-à-peu a un plus grand nombre; et en même temps aux différentes impressions de la lumière. S'il n'etudioit pas séparément chaque partie, il

ne verroit que des surfaces plates. Ainsi la statue ne parvient à voir tant de choses à-la-fois, que parce que les ayant remarquées séparément, elle se rapelle en un instant tous les jugemens qu'elle a portés l'un après l'autre.

Secours qu'ils tirent de la mémoire

Notre expérience peut nous convaincre combien la mémoire est nécessaire pour parvenir à saisir l'ensemble d'un objet fort composé. Au premier coup d'œil qu'on jette sur un tableau, on le volt fort imparfaitement: mais on porte la vue d'une figure a l'autre, et même on n'en regarde pas une toute entière. Plus on la fixe, plus l'attention se borne à une de ses parties: on n'aperçoit, par exemple, que la bouche.

Par-là, nous contractons l'habitude de parcourir rapidement tous les détails du tableau; et nous les voyons tout entier, parce que la mémoire nous présente à-la-fois tous les jugemens que nous avons portés successivement.

Mais cela est encore très-borné a notre égard. Si j'entre, par exemple, dans un grand cercle, il ne me donne d'abord qu'une idée vague de multitude. Je ne sais que je suis au milieu de dix ou douze personnes, qu'après les avoir conteste; c'est-à-dire, qu'après les avoir parcourues une à une avec une lenteur qui me fait remarquer la suite des mes jugemens. Si elles n'avoient été que trois, je ne les aurois moires parcourues; mais c'eût été avec une rapidité qui ne m'eût pas

permis de m'en apercevoir.

Si nos yeux n'embrassent une multitude d'objets qu'avec le secours de la mémoire, ceux de notre statue auront besoin du même secours pour saisir l'ensemble de la figure la plus simple. Car n'étant pas exercés, cette figure est encore trop composée pour eux. La statue n'aura donc l'idée d'un triangle, qu'après l'avoir analysé.

Ils jugent des situations

C'est la main, qui, fixant successivement la vue sur les différentes parties d'une figure, les grave toutes dans la mémoire: c'est elle qui conduit, pour ainsi dire, le pinceau; lorsque les yeux commencent à répandre au-dehors la lumière et les couleurs qu'ils ont d'abord senties en eux même.

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